How to assess populist discourse through three current approaches

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Review Article

How to assess populist discourse through three current approaches

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ABSTRACT   *There are several disputes on what populism is, but currently there is probably greater controversy over how to measure it. If we focus on populism as discourse, we can see that there is little ontological consensus. Here, the resolution of epistemological controversies is much less auspicious. In fact, types of methodological approaches and techniques differ substantively. This review article analyses three perspectives on populism, which are representative of three contemporary efforts to assess populism as discourse: first, the poststructuralist approach based on Laclau's theory; second, a mixed approach based on positivism, but employing hermeneutic techniques of textual analysis known as holistic grading; and third, content analysis, which is the most classical of these approaches, and the most quantitative, being based on counting phrases within texts. In spite of these differences, the approaches are in certain agreement: they employ a similar concept of populism, they accept that populism as discourse is triggered by certain structural factors and they identify the presence of a leader to catalyse populist discourse.*

Introduction

Most of the studies on populism have attracted controversy in either the historical-geographical field or the theoretical-epistemological arena. In the historical-geographical field, in which phenomena are identified and located in space, there are three analytical perspectives. First, Agricultural Populism that started in Russia in the hands of a group of *nardonik* intellectuals or populists,[1] for the purpose of recovering rural ideals as opposed to those of the Russian autocracy in the late 19th century.[2] Something similar occurred in the US, as the farmers and people's party with their agricultural economy attempted to halt financial and industrial capitalism and oppose elites of all sorts.[3] Second, Latin American Populism. Here, populism holds a very special status owing to the

fact that there is probably no country in the region that has not had populist leaders opposed to the oligarchic landowning establishment or North American imperialism. This political movement was, in many cases, quite effective, installing many presidents or at least non-traditional politics from which emerged opportunities for its adherents to become democratic leaders. In Latin America, populism arose in the middle of the 20th century and endures to the present time. Finally comes what is called neopopulism which started in Europe in the 1970s. It is characterized by right-wing politics, anti-immigration policies and xenophobic feelings.[4]

In the theoretical-epistemological field, populism has been studied from different perspectives; one of those is the structuralist approach in which populism is associated with the development of some countries that live in a state of social exclusion.[5] There is also an exclusively economic approach which is focused on finding quick solutions to social problems.[6] There are political approaches that have a charismatic leader with broad social support as a central figure whose main characteristic is the use of neoliberal policies.[7] We can recognize as well other approaches in which populism is seen as party organization,[8] or as a political style,[9] among others.

In this same field, this analysis focuses on an important contemporary approach to the study of populism called Discourse Analysis. Thus, populism has been studied from three main perspectives. The first is called poststructuralism and, based on the theory of Laclau, constitutes the broadest theoretical approach. According to the theory of political discourse (TPD), every social practice has a meaning and is considered to constitute discourse. Hence, every social practice has political potential, depending on its ability to differentiate itself between the system and its constitutive outside.[10] The second approach also understands populism as discourse, but in a postmodern sense, that is viewed as a set of ideas or latent frameworks of meaning, unintentionally manifested by individuals through speech, writing or some other type of symbolic action.[11] The third approach to populism understands discourse as explicit linguistic allocution, clearly stated in the content of a text; hence, this approach is based on the so-called field of content analysis.[12]

In an epistemological sense, we can also differentiate these three approaches according to the ways in which they measure populist discourse. Poststructuralism has always had a methodological weakness: clear research strategies are lacking. However, according to David Howarth, this approach should be understood within a hermeneutic context in which the researcher must carry out second-order interpretations of the actions and social practices under consideration.[13] The second approach mentioned earlier also proposes a hermeneutic way of accessing to the discourse, but within a positivist research context. Hence, it is possible to access the latent meaning of the text through interpretative analysis. Subsequently, it is possible to classify evidence according to defined positivist categories. On the other hand, the third approach is purely positivist and quantitative, encoding the phrases and/or words manifested in texts, so that analysts can classify them according to their populist intensity.

The aim of this review article is to analyse, at theoretical and methodological levels, three research efforts that embody the approaches mentioned earlier, and, mainly, to recognize those aspects among them that are most frequently similar.

Discourse and populism

The understanding of populism as discourse has been well developed by scholars. However, the meaning of discourse can be different from one approach to another. Hawkins defines discourse as different from the concept of ideology and from the manifest content of the text. His notion of ideology is related to coherent, conscious and comprehensive ideas, as well as to their complex articulation, quite useful for understanding and assessing the social world. However, discourse has nothing to do with the ideal speech situation—unlike Habermas' view—in which interconnected individuals are equal and conscious.[14] Hawkins' notion of discourse is quite similar to the notion of postmodern discourse: the latent framework of meaning of elocution, action or omission. Although discourse for Hawkins is a postmodern concept, we can see some differences with respect to poststructuralism. In fact, poststructuralism differs from linguistic analysis in that it rejects discourse merely as a semantic phenomenon; thus, the discursive structure of this approach is made up of meaningful social relationships and contemplative entities. Hence, poststructuralism states that discourse can correspond to a group of ideas as well as to a group of meaningful actions.[15] Moreover, every social practice has two main characteristics: it has meaning, and is fundamentally political. In other words, it embodies discourse. Laclau, unlike Hawkins, makes no reference to discourse in a narrow sense, but rather understands it as a set of phenomena that produce social meaning and establish society as such. The discursive element does not constitute a level or a social dimension, but is coextensive with the social scope. In consequence: (1) the discursive element does not constitute superstructure—unlike Marx's view—and (2) every social practice constitutes itself as a producer of meaning.[16]

Groppo, as distinct from Hawkins, considers discourse and ideology as similar concepts due to the fact that both function as schemes for understanding reality,[17] although they are not necessarily identical. However, just as Hawkins' conception of ideology is close to the one proposed by poststructuralism, Howarth—another poststructuralist scholar—argues that an ideology entails the complete closure of a political project.[18] Ideology is understood then as a comprehensive project which does not recognize its limitation in the sense that it denies the need for a constitutive outside.

On the other hand, Jagers and Walgrave only refer to the notion of ideology as a way to conceptualize populism as a political style.[19] However, they do not make an analytical distinction between discourse and ideology. For them, political style is an essentially discursive activity, and discourse and meaning are clearly present in a text.[20]

Despite the fact that notions of discourse differ from one author to another, the concept of populism in terms of discourse tends to be fairly homogeneous in these

three approaches. From the poststructuralist point of view, populism is understood as a political logic. It is a system of rules in which some people can be represented and others cannot.[21] From this perspective, populism is constituted by two dimensions: (1) a rupture with the *status-quo*, and (2) the effort of ordering where anomie and dislocation are produced:[22] 'There is in any society a reservoir of raw anti-status-quo feelings which crystallize in some symbols *quite independently of the forms of their political* articulation, and it is their presence we intuitively perceive when we call a discourse or a mobilization "populistic"'.[23]

Those anti-*status-quo* feelings harboured in popular tradition are the ones which express the contradiction between people and establishment. Thus, popular tradition represents precisely the following:

> The ideological crystallization of the resistance to oppression in general, that is, *to the very form of the State*, they will be longer lasting than class ideologies and will constitute a structural frame of reference of greater stability. But in the second place, popular traditions do not constitute consistent and organized discourses but merely *elements* which can only exist in articulation with class discourses.[24]

The quotation earlier is from one of Laclau's early works on populism. It is similar to Hawkins' notion of discourse as latent frameworks of meaning that do not constitute a coherent and organized corpus of ideas. For Hawkins discourse, or its closely related concept of world view as a set of ideas, is defined in his main work as follows:

> I define populism in terms of worldview and discourse, and I change the word into an adjective—populist movement, populist leader, etc.—when I want to refer to actual instances of populism. This cannot entirely eliminate our confusion, as we naturally tend to use the term 'populism' to refer not just to a set of ideas but to the larger set of practices of which they become a part (as in 'populism in Latin America first emerges in the early twentieth century'), but I try to use these terms carefully in order to preserve as clear a boundary as possible between ideas and actions.[25]

According to Hawkins—following de la Torre's definition[26]—the main characteristic of this group of ideas is 'an appeal to the people',[27] which is in accordance with the poststructuralist perspective. Similarly, Jagers and Walgrave, in what they call a thin concept, characterize populism as an appeal to the people, where the leader or party needs to feel identified with them.[28]

Hawkins' notion of populism rescues Laclau's[29] and Panizza's[30] conceptualizations. In this sense, it is placed in the thick of the postmodernist range of perspectives.[31] In addition, this author points to the definition of Mudde[32]—still a very minimal conception—which is essential for envisaging and disclosing the underlying logic of populism. Nevertheless, Hawkins seeks to surpass Mudde's definition in order to successfully operationalize the phenomenon.[33] Thus, the set of dimensions that consolidate the main ideas of the populist world view are: (1) a Manichaean outlook on the political and social realm; (2) the good is identified with the will of the people; (3) evil is identified with a conspiring oligarchy; (4) the need for systemic change (revolution); and (5) an 'anything-goes' attitude.[34]

For their part, Jagers and Walgrave also present a thick conception of populism, which is as minimal as Mudde's definition. But this definition of populism complements the more minimal thin concept of populism solely based on reference to the people:

> Populism always refers to *the people* and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; it is rooted in *anti-elite* feelings; and it considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an *exclusion* strategy.[35]

For the three current and representative studies that assess populism as discourse, the unfailing notion of the people occupies the central role in this concept. On the one hand, it is possible to observe this notion of the people either in the popular traditions that shelter the anti-*status-quo* feelings, or in the morally superior will of the people. On the other hand, we find the minority elite, oligarchy, *poderes fácticos*, the establishment, who are intrinsically diabolic and, in consequence, an illegitimate and worthless opponent. This Manichean division between people and elite, proposed by Hawkins, is defined as antagonism by poststructuralism. According to Laclau, in order to divide society antagonistically between underlings and rulers, discourse has to establish a contradiction and/or an antinomy rather than a mere difference. This contradiction must ensure the equivalence of elements on each side of the boundary, thus becoming increasingly antagonistic. Laclau defines this as populist rupture.[36] The earlier is to some extent similar to Jagers and Walgrave's exclusion strategy, because populism produces discourse which excludes the opposing other. Accordingly, there is consensus about the definition of populism proposed by Mudde, although he defines it as ideology.[37] Nevertheless, I argue that this consensus is about minimal definitions of populism. Mudde asserts:

> I define populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.[38]

To sum up, the feasible way to conceive this antagonism between people and elite is by defining the singularity of each populist discourse approach. Hereinafter, I will describe the different epistemological strategies and discourse evaluation instrument of the three approaches under consideration.

The methods and its results

The methodological improvements in TPD suggest that the empirical enforcement of its theoretical conceptions is closely related to hermeneutic analysis. Thus, TPD seeks to provide second-order interpretations about first-order observations, i.e. the understanding social actors have of their social conditions and social practices.[39] Moreover, TPD not only carries out ethnographic description, but also establishes that the main purpose of discursive research is explanation. In fact,

whether or not a discursive analyst seeks elucidation—to find those latent meanings—TPD also requires a description and an explanation through the conceptual devices of the theory.[40] Likewise, if the same discursive analyst aims to explain the phenomenon, the best way to do so is to implement comparative strategies. However, for such purposes our analyst must return to a thick, descriptive interpretation of several cases and situations in order to implement a better comparative explanation. Moreover, thick descriptions at the discursive level necessarily leave out large- N quantitative comparisons, in which only few cases can be assessed.[41] This is precisely the methodological strategy used by Groppo in which the hermeneutic device is available to the empirical analysis: '[. . .] the distinction between discourse analysis and discourse theory, in which the former consists of a range of techniques to analyse "talk and text in context", while the latter provides the underlying assumptions for their appropriate employment'.[42] Hence, the distinction between the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference, as well as the two senses of dislocation and the empty signifier, constitute the map—that is to say, the conceptual devices for analysing empirical cases. This will be explained later. The same function is performed by Hawkins' rubric, which is a binary schema of second-order observations for the achievement of hermeneutic interpretation. According to Gadamer in his concept of *Wirkungsgeschichte*[43]—which is the impact of the life history or biography on the capacity of interpretation that a human being has—these theoretical schemes function as prisms that reveal the meaning human beings provide for their social practices and allocutions.

Thus, the development of holistic grading requires the construction of a rubric or a two-column scheme with contrasting categories, and with a variety of dimensions or comparative patterns placed in rows. Text analysts or graders must be trained in the use of this simplified guide for evaluating a text to provide an interpretation of speeches. Hawkins makes use of the paradigmatic case of Chávez in Venezuela[44] to construct the rubric,[45] which is quite similar to a Weberian ideal type. In the columns, the author describes typical features of populist discourse and pluralist discourse for some issues. Hawkins chooses the pluralist discourse in contrast with populism based on the proposition noted by Canovan, who includes a two-dimension typology: on the one hand, discourse can be pragmatic or redemptive with regard to social problems; and on the other hand, discourse can be related to fundamental democratic principles and citizens' ability to govern themselves, or not.[46] Elitist discourse is not considered by Hawkins since it generally rejects law and citizenship. Moreover, elitism is a problematic category since it does not distinguish between a redemptive democratic attitude and a pragmatic democratic attitude. For this reason, populism and liberalism contrast with each other, thus helping to construct a more reliable rubric. Populism is sufficiently redemptive, while liberalism is sufficiently pragmatic; liberalism generally respects the law, while populism, on behalf of the people, can even break the law[47]—an 'anything-goes' attitude.

Through the holistic grading technique and the use of the rubric, analysts are able to assess speeches made by political leaders, and in that way they are able to

access the populist discourse defined in the five dimensions-premises mentioned earlier. This method adopted from the field of pedagogy aims to interpret texts as a whole:

> Unlike standard techniques of content analysis (either human coded or computer based), holistic grading asks readers to interpret whole texts rather than count content at the level of words or sentences. It is a pedagogical assessment technique that is widely used by teachers of writing and has been extensively developed by administrators of large-scale exams.[48]

Once the rubric is complete, the researcher must teach this scheme to the coders or text analysts. The training of coders is supported by anchor texts—samples—or excerpts taken from conferences which illustrate concrete forms of populist—or pluralist or mixed—discourse. In this sense, the drawback of the rubric is its limited grading, because the coders can only grade a speech as populist, pluralist or mixed. In conclusion, the rubric and anchor texts are the highlights of the holistic grading.[49]

Similarly to holistic grading, a poststructuralist researcher can also assess texts. In fact, Groppo selected different texts from newspapers, speeches and published interviews, interpreting them through second-order distinctions proposed by the theory. Although in Groppo's research there is no explicit method of text selection, we can assume that it was made ad hoc to the objective of the research and the methodological approach. Therefore, the sampling can be ethnographically defined as intentional. In the same way, Howarth argues that the selected texts are a direct consequence of the researcher's judgement about the importance of these texts to the research.[50]

In contrast to Groppo, Hawkins' sampling is more suitable for quantitative claims. With regard to sampling for the analysis of conferences given by a number of current leaders, speeches are randomly selected, fulfilling certain requirements such as minimum and maximum number of words—between 1000 and 3000, and the category of speech, for example campaign, ribbon-cutting, famous or most popular, and international speeches. It is expected that some speeches—such as campaign speeches—are more populist than others—such as ribbon-cutting speeches.[51]

In spite of the fact that Groppo and Hawkins share some similarities, they are placed in different scientific fields. However, both agree that texts must be analysed from a hermeneutic point of view that requires a previous binary dichotomy as an observation scheme, i.e. a second-order observation to assess first-order observations (texts).[52] Taking into account these second-order distinctions, it is possible to have access to meanings that are not manifest in the text, but rather are latent or implicit, unlike Jagers and Walgrave, who look for the manifest meaning within a text. In order to get a better understanding of the differences among these authors, it is necessary to address their theoretical and methodological scopes.

Hawkins defines populism using the notion of discourse instead of ideology, due to its empirical practicality. While Groppo regards discourse and ideology as equivalent concepts,[53] Hawkins understands populism neither as a set of coherent

ideas nor as manifest ones. Therefore, he cannot assess populist discourse through opinion surveys or content analysis of words and sentences. According to Hawkins, if populism is a set of latent, neither conscious nor comprehensive ideas, the best methodological strategy is a hermeneutic one. This is the main conceptual and methodological basis of Hawkins'—and, certainly, of poststructuralist— criticisms of Mudde's definition of populism, who understands the phenomenon as a manifest and versatile thin-centred ideology[54] that can be easily mixed with other thin or full-bodied ideologies such as socialism, communism, environment- alism or nationalism, among others.[55] For Hawkins, the manifest content analyses have a validity problem due to the fact that the techniques of this approach cannot measure populism as a set of latent ideas, but rather signifiers with or without a populist meaning. On the contrary, according to Mudde's definition of populism, the manifest content analyses do not lack validity since populism is understood as a type of ideology. For him, an ideology corresponds to a conscious set of ideas, which can be complex and widespread (full ideology) or not (thin-centred ideology). The definition of populism as thin-centred ideology is also shared by Jagers and Walgrave, who understand populism as a political style, as a way of comprehending linkages between voters and leaders. Thus, under this concept, they measure sentences which are coherently and explicitly expressed in the text.

Jagers and Walgrave aim to fathom the populist political style of the Belgian- Flemish parties through the political party broadcasts (PPBs), which are aired by public television VTR in Belgium. Between 1999 and 2001 they selected 20 broadcasts of each of the six biggest Flemish parties.[56] These samples represented 200 minutes per party or a total of 1200 minutes of PPBs. The selected PPBs were not electoral, but were chosen from ordinary periods. In order to avoid specific events affecting their results and to measure populist styles in daily conditions, they tried to maximize the dispersion of the PPBs selected over the whole period.[57] Jagers and Walgrave's research is located in the manifest content approach due to the fact that they measured the number and the intensity of references to the people and the related concept of population. These references to the people constitute the so-called 'people-index', which measures a part of Mudde's populism concept mentioned earlier. In fact, populism can also be assessed through a thick populism concept and measured through an 'anti-establishment-index', and an 'exclusivity- index'. This will be explained later.

In these three current approaches, dissent does not arise among the content of ideas that constitute populism, but rather from the way in which these ideas are presented. On the one hand, there is a consensus about the moral superiority of the people and popular will against the conspiring and oppressor elite. In these research efforts people and elite are dissociated at a Manichean or antagonistic level. On the other hand, the thin-centred ideology is a set of manifest and conscious ideas that can be easily mixed with other thin or full ideologies. The definition of populism as ideology given earlier by Mudde—and implicitly shared by Jagers and Walgrave, who assess the manifest content of the text—is quite contrary to the notion held by Hawkins and the poststructuralist researchers, because they search for the metanarrative meaning of a text. In consequence,

I argue that this dissent, at an epistemological level, triggers significant bifurcations among these three approaches.

Groppo: Perón and Vargas in comparative perspective

Four concepts are necessary to understand Groppo's poststructuralist analysis: dislocation, logic of difference, logic of equivalence and empty signifier. First, dislocation is an event which marks the failure of the full constitution of an existing order, and is located in the gap between a system/order and what opposes it.[58] Its primary sense relates to a disparity between the order and its outside; it is '[. . .] the moment in which an extra-discursive object or realm stages the limits of the system as such'.[59] In a second sense, dislocation relates to the disparity and instability in a certain order as well as in its parts and identities. In turn, it encourages the restructuring of the order as such: 'The concept of dislocation plays a role at the formal level, since it helps the theory show that any system has limits and that any identity is always threatened by the presence of an outside'.[60]

Second, the two logics are ways in which the TPD recognizes the construction of political identities. Groppo argues that:

> The concept of logic of equivalence refers to the construction of political identities through the erasure of the differences between particular identities by the creation of an identity to which they coherently oppose [. . .] we need to have something threatening and antagonising the whole set [. . .] the *logic of the difference* [. . .] is not purely negative and it can be incorporated and absorbed within the system [. . .] the result will not be the formation of an antagonising political force in the political formation, the second logic emphasises the articulation of political identities around strategies of incorporation within the system.[61]

The logic of equivalence places the conflict in the centre of the political arena and antagonistically divides social space. In contrast to equivalence, the logic of difference displaces the political conflict to the confines of the system. Thus, both logics function as a scheme for the analysis of concrete discursive strategies and the construction of identities.[62] Hence, these logics work as hermeneutic guides of empirical analysis.

Third, for Laclau the concept of an empty signifier is an acoustic image without meaning, which structures and produces order in a society:

> It is possible to say that political activity at its best is enough to make a certain signifier empty; that is, appropriated to fulfil that function of presenting society as relatively structured [. . .] an empty signifier is the only possibility of such a subject to fix meaning and give sense to their own world [. . .] The theoretical function of an empty signifier is to provide, in general, a dislocated situation with completeness and unity both at the level of political identities and at the social level.[63]

The challenge of Groppo's research is to operationalize and empirically assess concrete cases through the TPD. To accomplish this task, the author uses the comparative method. Certainly, this method involves the recognition of the explanatory effect of some particular social conditionings, which in particular cases

may trigger the phenomenon. Some explanatory variables in Groppo's research are mentioned in the initial pages of his book: 'This research shows that Vargas needed to operate in a situation of higher structural complexity, thus diminishing conflict, while Perón, due to a less complex and uneven structural complex, found no hindrance for the triggering of antagonism'.[64] Nevertheless, the structural conditionings of Brazilian and Argentinean societies are not the only causes:

> This does not mean that I rely on an extra-discursive dynamism to explain the political order. Instead I say that starting from those contextual extra-discursive structures does not necessarily produce specific political outcomes. Between conditioning structures and political strategy there is contingency.[65]

A specific kind of comparative method used in Groppo's research is the focus on difference. This approach selects cases of similar characteristics (control variables): Peronism and Varguism arose in quite parallel periods in the same international context. Argentina and Brazil are countries with large populations, they are agroexport powers, and they have similar cultural and religious backgrounds, etc. On the other hand, according to Groppo, these cases had different results; that is, the dependent variable or the particular political intervention worked in a different manner in each case due to the fact that the political logic used by Vargas (difference) was dissimilar to the logic used by Perón (equivalence). The empiric content of Groppo's book attempts to achieve the earlier. Thus, through an exhaustive historic-discursive analysis the author argues:

> This first meaning of dislocation was also useful to analyse Vargas' initial politics. The condition of possibility for such a politic was that the lines of ideological conflict were not passing through Vargas' figure; in other words, Vargas did not incarnate the main political division in Brazil immediately after 1930 and until 1945.[66]

In this way, Groppo asserts that Vargas did not enforce a logic of antagonism, but this role was played by Luiz Carlos Prestes in the post-revolutionary period.[67] To the contrary, in Argentina Perón developed the antagonism himself, and it triggered at the same time a dislocation regarding its secondary sense:

> If the emergence of Getulio Vargas can be characterised in terms of the logic of difference, the emergence of Perón in Argentina was an example of the logic of antagonism. To grasp the effects Perón's emergence had over political identities, I have used the concept of dislocation in its second sense, as a (disruptive) phenomenon that shows itself as the very limits of the system.[68]

For Groppo, several independent variables explain the difference between the logics used by Vargas and Perón: (1) a political formation that can be either nationalized and integrated, or regionalized and fragmented; (2) a radical inclusion of a subaltern subject; and (3) the introduction of a specific type of an empty signifier. Thus, the difference between Peronism and Varguism lies in the different values given to these three explanatory variables.

With regard to the first of these, it is evident how the socio-structural conditions were different in these two countries. While in Brazil there was a regionalization

structure, in Argentina nationalization was the norm. Thus, the structurally disparate conditions in Brazil—where the discourse, strategies and institutional logics are unfolded—had an unequal development throughout the country, unlike Argentina where there was a more homogeneous situation.[69]

The subaltern subject in the Argentinean case was included under a nationalized development of a link between the workers of the cities and the rural workers. This was implemented by Perón thanks to the Secretary of Labour and Welfare and through the Statute of the Rural Worker.[70] To the contrary, in Brazil the link between urban workers and peasants was non-existent. The Consolidation of Labour Laws was not extended to the rural workers since they did not demand their social rights. Therefore, for the *Estado Novo*, these laws had to be implemented through social struggle. Nevertheless, urban workers were attended to in a different way; they received these laws as a concession or as a pure gift from the government without previous demand.[71]

The last variable considers that in Peronism the politicization of the social sphere was produced by an unconditioned view of social justice:

> The remainder of a particular content of 'social justice', that is, the fact that it was unconditional and absolute, without predicates, made the signifier fulfil the role of questioning the relations of authority implicit in social and labour relations and, thus, give an antagonising power to Perón's proposal.[72]

Hence, thanks to a nationalized structural condition different from that of Vargas, Perón developed the antagonism at the centre of the political arena:

> In the case of Brazil, the national unity was a central signifier in most of the circulating discourses in the revolutionary aftermath. It was possible for it to be linked to 'regional autonomy' or 'federalism'. In that sense, national unity's political language within Varguism did not imply a politics of deletion of the states in the name of the Nation-State, but a complex negotiation of both levels in which sometimes the former and not the latter played the central role.[73]

Hawkins: populist discourse and its bearer

Hawkins' research mixes two approaches and allows for the triangulation of techniques and cases. It makes it possible to test populism under several explanatory models. Thus, the independent variables found can work in several spatio-temporal situations, extending its generalization possibilities.

After analysing the concept of populism and where it can be found through holistic grading in a large sample,[74] the author tries to explain its causes. First, he explains why populism emerges from the Venezuelan case of Hugo Chávez and, second, Hawkins puts forward a generalizable model of the conditioning factors of populism.

Hawkins argues that the populist regime of Chávez is triggered by corruption—specifically, the perception of corruption.[75] Nevertheless, for the author, what remains unclear is the relation between corruption and the political crisis of the Pacto de Punto Fijo. The multivariable analysis shows that corruption itself is not a

sufficient condition to explain populism, nor is corruption associated with any other significant explanatory variable, such as long-run economic performance either.[76] It seems to be that some variable is missing.[77]

For this reason, Hawkins seeks to add to his cases. Through the study of several experiences of populism he aims to find what further condition is necessary to explain the Venezuelan case as well as other similar cases. For the author, that explanatory missing variable is the leader as bearer and catalyst of the populist process:

> When we consider the supply side of populism, we must instead examine the factors governing the presence of a populist leader [...] charismatic leadership is a likely condition for populist movements to become successful and win control of government [...] by providing followers with additional non-material incentives and a focal point for participation, and they can speak with one voice on issues of tactics and strategy.[78]

Thus, Hawkins returns to assess this variable in the Venezuelan case. In order to do so, it is necessary to know in depth the forms of populist organizations, such as the Círculos Bolivarianos in Venezuela. These organizations are generally grass roots, political movements with low institutionalization, in which unity is based on the leader and his charisma. The Círculos integrate some aspects of the populist discourse as the disruptive attitude: the anything-goes attitude and the Manichaean outlook on the political and social realm, and the insularity—the tendency to be isolated from the rest of civil society.[79]

In summary, in his explanatory model of Venezuelan populism, Hawkins regards two factors which can better explain the phenomenon. These were tested from different approaches and techniques: (1) corruption in a context of social and economic crisis, and (2) the presence of a leader who catalyses the populist world view.

Jagers and Walgrave: Belgian-Flemish populism

Jagers and Walgrave distinguished between thin populism and thick populism, with centrally important consequences in their operationalization and measuring of populism. Based on the definition of thin populism or populism as an appeal to the people, they selected and assessed a 20-hour sample of broadcasting of all the parties studied. The authors used this concept of populism as a heuristic device which allows them to select specific excerpts from their sample. They found several references to the people or population in about 1200 excerpts. Jagers and Walgrave assessed these excerpts through a thick populism concept, that is to say, whether the broadcast was anti-establishment (anti-establishment index) and exclusionary (exclusivity index) or not. Finally, they mixed both categories of thin and thick populisms to reach a definitive index of populism that is presented later.[80]

First, the thin populism intensity measure is based on the number of times the appeal to the people appears. In consequence, the authors found that the Vlaams Block is the most populist. They also observed that the incumbent parties as the VLD—the liberal party, the SP.A—the socialist party, and the Agalev—the green

party were less populist. In contrast, the former ruling party CD&V—the Christian-democrat party—had a high level of thin populism, since during the time this study was carried out, it was in opposition. Hence, to be or not to be an incumbent party is a variable that explains the intensity of thin populism, since the three opposition parties—Vlaams Block, CD&V and VU-ID Flemish National-ist—presented the highest intensity of thin populism.[81]

Second, Jagers and Walgrave mixed the results of their measuring of thin populism and thick populism. On the one hand, in its anti-establishment dimension, or the antagonism between the people and the elite, they identified the three following sub-dimensions: anti-establishment feelings against the State, against the politicians and against mass media. The anti-State and anti-mass media references were very few, except for the Vlaams Block excerpts which achieved very high levels in both categories. In the anti-politician index, the Vlaams Block surpassed four times the score of the VU-ID. Basically, the integrated anti-establishment index is high in all opposition parties, but Vlaams Block achieved the highest populist score.[82] On the other hand, in the exclusivity index the authors found a clearer situation. They assessed the references of each party to other social actors such as capitalists, labours, freethinkers, Catholics, Protestants, etc., classifying into a trichotomic scheme (positive, neutral, negative). In this index, the Vlaams Block presented an unambiguous attitude towards certain social groups, e.g. immigrants, vagrants and criminals, developing a systematic discursive strategy of social exclusion.[83]

Finally, Jagers and Walgrave found that the discourse of Vlaams Block was substantially opposed to the rest of the Belgian-Flemish parties. Therefore, it constituted a paradigmatic case of a European populist right-wing party. A thin populist style of other Flemish parties can be explained due to the incumbent-opposition variable, which are not necessarily cases of populist parties.

Each study through a critical eye

In Groppo's findings, a question remains open. There is always an epistemological enticement to define populism based on the Peronist experience, that is to say, to conceptualize populism through an inductive practice. In this light one may ask whether populism equals Peronism, Varguism or even Chavism. Are the three explanatory variables of populism in Groppo's research (a political nationalized formation; a radical inclusion of a subaltern subject; and an empty signifier) a customized description of Peronism?

From a more positivist methodological perspective, the operationalization of Groppo's research seems to be vague. The discursive analysis presents a certain opacity between the construction of variables and their values, i.e. there is no sampling process that determines why some texts are representative of certain discourses. Thus, this problem can be defined as 'a sample without universe'. Even in ethnography, it is necessary to establish some sampling criteria that do not necessarily have statistical representativeness, but rather ad hoc samplings serving the research objective. Accurately, Howarth makes the same argument.[84] The ad

hoc selection (or criteria of relevance) is not explicitly referred to in Groppo's book, nor did the author describe his own selection techniques of texts. Undoubtedly, the absence of a qualitative criterion of sampling is a serious drawback in Groppo's research.

The originality of Hawkins' research is primarily based on holistic grading and on his skill at mixing different approaches. First, in the last feature mentioned earlier, the author argues that the case of Chávez is dealt with by a qualitative ethnographic approach combined with a multivariable statistic one. Second, the comparative case-oriented study of populism is also—according to Hawkins— basically quantitative. It is necessary to clarify this point, because his analysis is closer to a Qualitative Comparative Analysis[85] in which a deterministic estimate is preferred over a probabilistic one. Third, the comparative analysis is placed in a positivist context, although the holistic grading technique is properly qualitative, such that its features are characteristic of a qualitative and interpretive approach. This is evident when Hawkins appeals to the hermeneutic skills of text analysts as well as to the training necessary 'to read between lines'.

One additional aspect requires further comment. Hawkins moves from a case study to a cross-national study and vice versa, which has the great advantages described earlier. The problem in the study is related to the validity of some variables, since some of them work better in the Venezuelan case, while others seem to work better in other cases.

Jagers and Walgrave developed a descriptive comparative analysis. Hence, they cannot explain why populism arises, that is to say, the reason or explanatory variable that determines populism in the Vlaams Block party. The authors only explain thin populism in Flemish opposition parties through the incumbent-opposition variable; however, this is not a proper explanatory model of populism. In this sense one wonders whether the mere appeal to the people and population defines a party as populist. This is probably quite vague since other ideologies or world views can also manifest appeals to the people or similar references without being necessarily understood as populist ideologies. In consequence, the thin populism concept in itself, without other distinctive features, cannot be populism as such. Therefore, populism, in a more accurate sense but, in my view, still as a minimal concept, should at least regard the Manichean antagonism between people and oligarchy. Thus, the concept of populism can obtain some degree of singularity and avoid the confusion among other set of ideas exhibiting similar semantics.

Discourse, structure and leader

There are two premises that stem from the comparative and simultaneous observation of these studies. The first relates to the institutional impact of discourse, while the second posits that discourse, with no other non-discursive variables, has little influence on certain structures or institutions. Therefore, discourse itself has a low explanatory capacity for the social change.

The first premise was asserted by Panniza, who argues that populism can construct political institutions, such that discourse affects the rest of the social field.[86]

This works throughout the three analysed cases. However, according to the second premise, discourse itself has no impact on social change. Therefore, discourse needs help from other variables in order to explain social change, that is to say, the rise of populism as a hegemonic form of social linkage requires something more than a particular discourse. This idea is similar to Cammack's argument, who considers that populism works at three simultaneous and integrated levels: the discursive level, the institutional level and in economic policy within a specific historic context.[87] For example, Groppo notes how different kinds of variables complement each other to explain the full emergence of populism in Argentina. He considers a structural condition he calls nationalized social formation—unlike the federalist social formation in Brazil—which, alongside other discursive factors such as the radical inclusion of a subaltern subject and an empty signifier, trigger Peronism.

In Groppo's model, the presence of a leader is the key element to explain the rising of Peronism and Varguism. In the first case, the political conflict was constructed over Perón, that is the antagonism itself, or full populism. However, in Brazil this was not the case: Vargas did not become a leader of dissent, thus a full populist regime did not arise, at least in his first term of government. Similarly in the explanatory model of Hawkins, the presence of a leader is also central, since he acts as the catalyst of populist ideas. Thus, the presence of a leader, the crisis of Pacto de Punto Fijo, the economic crisis and a supporting social movement were the necessary conditions that triggered Chavism. The notion of the leader in Jagers and Walgrave's research is succinct, almost implicit. They assert only that the leader can strengthen the public discontent with institutions,[88] which is a reference to the anti-establishment dimension of the thick populism notion. Although Jagers and Walgrave's model is much more restricted than the others, they also mention a kind of institutional variable that would have an effect on the thin populist discourse (reference to the people) and relates to the incumbent-opposition position of political parties.

To sum up, the three research projects assess populism as discourse, understanding it as a set of ideas that radicalizes the notion of people against a usurper, oppressor and intrinsically bad oligarchy. It is also possible to distinguish, in the comparative study of these studies, that discourse can develop changes in the polity or political institutions of a country, as well as in the political arena through the representation of Manichean or radical ideas, and even in the field of policy, as Hawkins[89] and Groppo[90] argue in their respective books. But the political impact of populist discourse could only occur under certain structural-institutional conditions, which are different depending on each case, and with the presence of a leader to catalyse populist ideas. As a whole, these factors can trigger the rise of populism as an institutional phenomenon.

Disclosure statement

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Notes and References

1. *Narodnik* or populist comes from *narod* which means people. In this sense, populism is known as *narodchietsvo*.
2. E. Tijeras, 'Venturi: "El populismo ruso"', *Triunfo*, 17 (1976), pp. 104–108; F. Venturi, *Il Populismo Russo* (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1972); A. Walicki, 'Russia', in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (Eds) Populismo: sus significados y características nacionales (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1970), pp. 81–120.
3. R. Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); M. Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), pp. 9–77.
4. H.-G. Betz and S. Immerfall (Eds), *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); H. Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); C. Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); P. Taggart, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). In this paper, I consider as neopopulist only those European phenomena from the last quarter of the 20th century to the present. Instead, I assert that the 'Latin American neopopulism', that is to say the so-called 'radical populism' (C. de la Torre, 'Populismo radical y democracia en Los Andes', *Journal of Democracy en Español*, 1(1) (2009), pp. 24–37), is a phenomenon essentially similar to populism of the middle 20th century.
5. F.E. Cardoso and E. Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); G. Germani, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición; de la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1965); G. Germani, *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978); O. Ianni, *A formação do Estado Populista na América Latina* (Sao Paulo: Editora Ática, 1989).
6. L.C. Bresser (Ed.), *Populismo econômico: ortodoxia, desenvolvimentismo e populismo na América Latina* (Sao Paulo: Nobel, 1991); R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards (Eds), *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
7. K.M. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the Peruvian case', *World Politics*, 48 (1995), pp. 82–116; K. Weyland, 'Neopopulism and neoliberalism in Latin America: unexpected affinities', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 31(3) (1996), pp. 3–31.
8. P. Taggart, *Populism* (Buckingham-Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2000).
9. P.-A. Taguieff, *L'Illusion Populiste* (Paris: Champs Flammarion, 2007); A. Knight, 'Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30 (1998), pp. 223–248.
10. A representative work of this approach corresponds to the Alejandro Groppo's research which compares the government of Juan Domingo Perón of Argentina to the government of Getulio Vargas of Brazil. Thus, Laclau's view on poststructuralism is empirically developed in: *The Two Princes: Juan D. Perón and Getulio Vargas: A Comparative Study of Latin American Populism* (Córdoba: EDUVIM, 2009).
11. The second instance I examine corresponds to the research of Kirk Hawkins which is representative of the positivist and hermeneutic approaches as such, and his aim is to measure the latent populist discourse in several presidents' speeches around the world through holistic grading. His work is formally presented in: 'Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(8) (2009), pp. 1040–1067; and in: *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
12. Jan Jagers and Stefan Walgrave carried out research on Belgian populism from a quantitative and positivist perspective. They analysed television programme texts written by six Flemish parties focused on the case of the Vlaams Block party; the technique employed was based on counting phrases through human coding. This research can be found in: 'Populism as political communication style: an empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium, *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (2007), pp. 319–345.
13. D. Howarth, 'Applying discourse theory: the method of articulation', in D. Howarth and J. Torfing (Eds) *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
14. K.A. Hawkins, 'Measuring populist discourse through holistic grading', Paper prepared for the annual Conferencia de la Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política (Santiago: Chile, 2006).
15. D. Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham-Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2000), pp 101–103.
16. E. Laclau, 'Ruptura Populista y Discurso', in Labastida and Del Campo (Eds) *Hegemonía y Alternativas Políticas* (México: Siglo XXI, 1985), pp. 39–44.
17. Groppo, *The Two Princes*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10, p. 33. Groppo considers the concepts of discourse and ideology at the same level, as Laclau also asserts (E. Laclau, 'The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1 (1996), pp. 201–220). However, Howarth presents the existing differences between these concepts (Howarth, *Discourse*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 15).
18. Howarth, *Discourse*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 15, pp. 122–123.

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19. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 322.
20. There are mainly two kind of content analysis of manifest populist discourse (M. Rooduijn and T. Pauwels, 'Measuring populism: comparing two methods of content analysis', *West European Politics*, 34(6) (2011), pp. 1272–1283). On the one hand, the content analysis based on human codification (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12; A.M. Wüst and A. Volkens, 'Euromanifesto coding instructions', *Working Paper 64* (Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2003); and, on the other hand, the content analysis based on computer codification (e.g. T. Pauwels, 'Measuring populism: a quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21 (2011), pp. 97–119).
21. E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005).
22. Laclau, *ibid.*, pp. 121–122.
23. Laclau, *ibid.*, p. 123.
24. E. Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism* (London: NLB, 1977), p. 167.
25. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, p. 41.
26. C. de la Torre, 'Populism and democracy: political discourses and cultures in contemporary Ecuador', *Latin American Perspectives*, 24(3) (1997), pp. 12–24, p. 14; C. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 4.
27. K.A. Hawkins, 'Populism in Venezuela: the rise of Chavismo', *Third World Quarterly*, 24 (2003), pp. 1137–1160, p. 1139.
28. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, pp. 322–323.
29. Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, *op. cit.*
30. F. Panizza (Ed.), 'Introduction: populism and the mirror of democracy', in *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 1–33.
31. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, p. 346.
32. C. Mudde, 'The populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39 (2004), pp. 542–563.
33. Hawkins, 'Is Chávez populist?', *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, pp. 1046–1047.
34. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp. 1043–1044; Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, pp. 54–69.
35. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 322.
36. Laclau, 'Ruptura Populista y Discurso', *op. cit.*, Ref. 16, pp. 41–44.
37. Mudde asserts that the minimal definition of populism is shaped thank to a conversation with Jan Jagers (Mudde, 'The populist Zeitgeist', *op. cit.*, Ref. 32, p. 543).
38. Mudde, *ibid.*, p. 54.
39. Howarth, 'Applying discourse theory', *op. cit.*, Ref. 13, pp. 319–321.
40. Howarth, *ibid.*, pp. 319–320.
41. Howarth, *ibid.*, pp. 332–335.
42. Howarth, *ibid.*, p. 336.
43. H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Continuum, 1989).
44. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, pp. 17–29.
45. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp. 53–70, pp. 251–253.
46. M. Canovan, 'Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy', *Political Studies*, 47 (1999), pp. 2–16.
47. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, pp. 37–38.
48. Hawkins, *ibid.*, p. 71.
49. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp. 70–74.
50. Howarth, 'Applying discourse theory', *op. cit.*, Ref. 13, p. 337.
51. I was told by Kirk Hawkins that he had found in speech codifications certain steadiness in the populist discourse depending on the category of speech. Thus, the most populist allocutions are campaign and famous speeches, and the less populist allocutions are ribbon-cutting and international speeches.
52. For an analysis in depth about second-order observation, see N. Luhmann, *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990); H. Maturana and F. Varela, *El Árbol del Conocimiento. Las Bases Biológicas del Entendimiento Humano* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1987).
53. In the context of his research strategy, Groppo does not distinguish between ideology and discourse due to the fact that the manifest and the latent content of a text are sufficient to explain his arguments. He argues that discourse and ideology are concepts that help to understand the social realm. Nevertheless, like Hawkins, Groppo pays more attention to the latent content of a text than to the coherent ideas of an ideology as Freeden refers (M. Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
54. See Freeden, *ibid.*, Chapter 7.
55. Mudde, 'The populist Zeitgeist', *op. cit.*, Ref. 32, pp. 543–546.

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56. The broadcasts are completely controlled by the parties' headquarters.
57. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, pp. 325–326.
58. Groppo, *The Two Princes*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10, p. 38.
59. Groppo, *ibid.*, pp. 38–39.
60. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 39.
61. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 42.
62. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 43.
63. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 49.
64. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 54.
65. Groppo, *ibid.*
66. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 293.
67. Groppo, *ibid.*, pp. 139–235. See Chapter 5 of Groppo's book.
68. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 294.
69. Groppo, *ibid.*, pp. 296–297.
70. Groppo, *ibid.*, pp. 140ff.
71. Groppo, *ibid.*, pp. 276ff.
72. Groppo, *ibid.*, p. 298.
73. Groppo, *ibid.*, pp. 298–299.
74. The assessed Latin American presidents from high to low populism were: Chávez, Velasco Ibarra, Morales, Perón, Vargas, Menem, Saca, Cárdenas, Duarte, Palacio, Toledo, Fernández, Fox, Lula, Vásquez, Kirchner, Pacheco, Torrijos, Mesa, Lagos, Berger, Bolaños, Maduro y Uribe. For the rest of the world the scale was: Lukashenko, Bush, Ahmahdinejad, Yushchenko, Arroyo, Putin, Blair, Kufuor, Stoltenberg, Enkhbayar, Stanishev, Harper, Halonen, Mbeki, Zapatero, Persson. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, pp. 1053–1054, pp. 76–77.
75. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp. 88–130.
76. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp. 160–161.
77. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp. 163–164.
78. Hawkins, *ibid.*, p. 163.
79. Hawkins, *ibid.*, pp 166–194. K.A. Hawkins and D. Hansen, 'Dependent civil society: the Círculos Bolivarianos in Venezuela', *Latin American Research Review*, 41 (2006), pp. 102–132. See Chapter 6 in Hawkins' book.
80. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 326 and pp. 338–343.
81. Jagers and Walgrave, *ibid.*, pp. 326–327.
82. Jagers and Walgrave, *ibid.*, pp. 328–331.
83. Jagers and Walgrave, *ibid.*, pp. 331–332.
84. Howarth, *ibid.*, p. 337.
85. C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
86. F. Panizza, 'Neopopulism and its limits in Collor's Brazil', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 19(2) (2000), pp. 177–192.
87. P. Cammack, 'The resurgence of populism in Latin America', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 19 (2000), pp. 149–161, p. 152.
88. Jagers and Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style', *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 338.
89. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, pp. 195–230.
90. Groppo, *The Two Princes*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10.